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Abstract 
The literature on trade openness, economic development, and the environment is largely 
inconclusive about the environmental consequences of trade. This study treats trade and 
income as endogenous and estimates the overall impact of trade openness on 
environmental quality using the instrumental variables technique. We find the impact is 
large in the long term, after the dynamic adjustment process, although it is small in the 
short term. Trade is found to benefit the environment in OECD countries. It has 
detrimental effects, however, on sulfur dioxide (SO2) and carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions in non-OECD countries, although it does lower biochemical oxygen demand 
(BOD) emissions in these countries. Finally, trade openness influences emissions 
through the environmental regulation effect and capital labor effect. We find that the 
former effect is likely to be larger than the latter effect for all pollutants. 
 
JEL. F18; O13; L60; L50 
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1.  Introduction 
The environmental effect of trade openness has been one of the most important 
questions in trade policy for the past 10 years (see Copeland and Taylor, 2005; Taylor, 
2004). Empirical studies on the relationship between international trade openness and 
environmental quality have been accumulating (see, e.g., Antweiler et al., 2001; 
Harbaugh et al., 2002; Cole and Elliott, 2003; Frankel and Rose, 2005). However, there 
are very few empirical studies on the determinants of emissions based on the theoretical 
framework.  
Antweiler et al. (2001) first provide the theoretical framework to empirically 
explore the determinants of emissions and to successfully decompose them into scale, 
technique, and composition effects. The scale effect refers to the effect of an increase in 
production (e.g., GDP) on emissions. The technique effect indicates the negative impact 
of income on emission intensity. This refers to the effect of more stringent 
environmental regulations, which promote the employment of more 
environmentally-friendly production methods and which are put in place as additional 
income increases the demand for a better environment. The composition effect explains 
how emissions are affected by the composition of output (i.e., the structure of the 
industry), which is determined by the degree of trade openness as well as by the 
comparative advantage of the country. This effect could be positive or negative, 
depending on the country’s resource abundance and the strength of its environmental 
policy. These are called the capital–labor effect (KLE) and the environmental regulation 
effect (ERE), respectively
1.  
                                                  
1 Countries where the capital-labor ratio is relatively high are expected to have a comparative 
advantage in capital-intensive goods (i.e., pollution goods) and thus, to produce more emissions. 
Trade openness would strengthen the effects of this comparative advantage and of any  2
Since trade openness could increase production and income, it affects emissions 
through the scale effect and the technique effect (Antweiler et al., 2001). Hereafter, we 
call these effects the trade-induced scale effect and the trade-induced technique effect. 
Antweiler et al. (2001) estimate how trade openness (increase in trade intensity) and 
GDP (or per capita income) affect pollution by using data on sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
concentrations. They find that SO2 concentrations increase as GDP rises (i.e., positive 
scale effect), decrease as per capita income rises (i.e., negative technique effect), and 
decrease as trade openness rises (i.e., negative composition effect). Similarly, Cole and 
Elliott (2003) analyze country-level emissions per capita of sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon 
dioxide (CO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and biochemical oxygen demand (BOD)) and 
estimate the net of the scale effect and the technique effect, and the composition effect
2.  
                                                                                                                                                  
between-country differences in environmental policy on the industrial structure. Therefore, more 
openness would increase the production share of the goods in which these countries have a 
comparative advantage (i.e., capital-intensive goods). On the other hand, trade openness would 
reduce the comparative advantage of capital-intensive goods in countries that have relatively strict 
environmental policies (i.e., higher income countries) while increasing the comparative advantage of 
such goods in countries with less stringent environmental regulations (i.e., laxity is a source of 
comparative advantage). As a result, the production of capital-intensive goods under more (or less) 
stringent regulations decreases (increases), and the emissions decrease (increase). This is called the 
ERE, or, in other words, the pollution haven effect. The net effect of the composition effect as a 
result of trade openness could therefore be positive or negative, depending on the relative sizes of 
the KLE and the ERE (see Cole and Elliott, 2003). 
2  In Cole and Elliott (2003, 2006), the scale effect and the technique effect are not separated because 
real GDP per capita is used as a proxy for both production and per capita income level. Therefore, 
the net of the scale effect and the technique effect is estimated and named the scale-technique effect. 
In this study, we estimate the scale-technique effect following Cole and Elliott (2003, 2006). Hence, 
we call the net of the trade-induced scale effect and the trade-induced technique effect as the 
trade-induced scale-technique effect.  3
However, these previous studies do not consider the endogeneity problem and, 
therefore, do not treat the effect of trade openness on production or income explicitly. 
Therefore, the effects of trade openness on emissions via income and production 
changes (i.e., the trade-induced scale and technique effects) cannot be compared to the 
composition effect induced by trade. As a result, we cannot infer the overall 
environmental consequences of trade as a summation of these effects. For instance, in 
the case of Cole and Elliott’s (2003) finding on SO2 emissions, in which an increase in 
income reduces emissions (i.e., negative net scale and technique effects) while trade 
openness increases emissions (i.e., positive composition effects), we are not able to 
judge whether the overall sign of the effect of trade on emissions is positive or negative. 
  Furthermore, we need to note that an increase in income (or production) 
associated with trade openness might affect the composition effect. For example, the 
composition effect resulting from the ERE might be larger under more stringent policies. 
However, since the endogeneity of income is not considered in these previous studies, 
estimates of the composition effect induced by trade do not include this effect. 
  We also apply a dynamic model to consider an adjustment process. This is 
because it is important to clarify the short- and long-term effects of trade on the 
environment. Since the former studies do not consider the dynamic adjustment process, 
we must consider their results primarily to be short-term effects. This may explain why 
the effects of trade on the environment that they calculate are rather small.   
In this study, we explore the short-term and the long-term overall effects of trade 
openness on emissions as well as decomposed effects, such as the trade-induced 
scale-technique effects and the trade-induced composition effects by extending the 
previous studies in the following ways: (1) we add the income equation to consider the  4
effect of trade openness on real GDP per capita explicitly, and (2) we employ a dynamic 
model. 
 
2.  Model 
2.1   Empirical  Strategy 
Antweiler et al. (2001) analyze SO2 concentrations in 43 countries from 1971 to 
1996. They find positive scale effects, negative technique effects, and negative 
trade-induced composition effects. Thus, since the technique effects dominate the scale 
effects on average, they conclude that trade openness is associated with reduced 
pollution. Similarly, Cole and Elliott (2003) and Cole (2006) analyze country-level 
emissions (SO2, CO2, NOx, and BOD) and energy consumption per capita, and they 
estimate the scale-technique effects and composition effects. Their findings generally 
support those of Antweiler et al. (2001) for SO2. The results suggest that greater 
openness reduces BOD emissions per capita but is likely to increase NOx and CO2 
emissions and energy use. 
These studies analyze how trade openness and income affect the environment. 
However, we are not able to find a causal relationship if we treat trade openness as 
exogenous
3. Therefore, in addition to addressing the endogeneity of income, the 
endogeneity of trade needs to be modeled to analyze the consequences of trade for the 
environment (Copeland and Taylor, 2005; Frankel and Rose, 2005).   
Frankel and Rose (2005) consider trade openness and income endogenously. 
They address the potential simultaneity of trade, environmental quality, and income by 
                                                  
3  See Frankel and Romer (1999) and Noguer and Siscart (2005) for recent studies that treat trade as 
endogenous and that estimate the impact of trade on income using instrumental variables.    5
applying instrumental variables estimations using a gravity model of bilateral trade and 
endogenous growth from neoclassical growth equations. It should be noted that they do 
not derive these estimations from a theoretical model like Antweiler et al. (2001) and 
thus that they do not consider the decomposed effects. They estimate an environmental 
quality equation, a trade equation, and an income equation to test a causal relationship 
between trade and environmental outcomes. Using cross section data from 41 countries 
in 1990 and looking at the sign of the openness variable, they support the optimistic 
view that trade reduces sulfur dioxide emissions
4.  
In this study, we use a larger and more globally representative sample, 
especially including more developing countries, of many local and global emissions 
than are reflected in previous studies. Panel data used in this study are the SO2 and CO2 
emissions of 88 countries from 1973 to 2000 and the BOD emissions of 83 countries 
from 1980 to 2000.   
In econometric models, serial correlation must be considered because the 
environmental and output dependent variables have relatively monotonic trends. 
However, previous studies of international trade and the environment do not control for 
this factor when analyzing panel data. It should be noted that a dynamic generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimation of panel data applied to a dynamic model is 
useful both to correct for serial correlation and to analyze both short- and long-term 
effects of trade openness on the environment.   
                                                  
4  Some of the variables used in Frankel and Rose (2005) are excluded from our estimated results in 
this paper because they are not statistically significant or because we are not able to explain the 
intuition behind the results regarding those variables. Instead, we follow the choice of variables from 
Cole and Elliott (2003). See also Chintrakarn and Millimet (2006) for another application where they 
analyze the causal effect of domestic state-level trade flows on toxic emissions in the US.  6
Improving the previous studies in several ways can produce a broader view of 
environmental consequences, and, therefore, we might come to different conclusions 
about the linkage between international trade and environmental quality. 
2.2    Model 
This study considers the endogeneity of trade openness and income and then 
estimates an environmental quality equation. Here, we only discuss the environmental 
quality equation. Equations of income and trade openness are discussed in Appendix A. 
2.2.1  Environmental Quality Equation 
This study employs a specification similar to that of Cole and Elliott (2003) 
under which the determinants of emissions can be decomposed into scale-technique and 
composition effects. Contrary to the study by Cole and Elliott (2003), a lagged term of 
the dependent variable and international protocol dummies are included. The lagged 
variable is intended to control for the effect of the dynamic process. 
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where Eit denotes emissions (SO2, CO2, and BOD) per capita of country i in year t (for 
example, kilograms of sulfur dioxide per capita), and S is GDP per capita. GDP per 
capita and its quadratic are intended to capture the scale-technique effect. T is defined as 
the ratio of aggregate exports and imports to GDP, which, as in the growth literature, 
proxies trade openness (or trade intensity) (see, e.g., Antweiler et al., 2001; Frankel and 
Rose, 2005)
 5; K/L denotes a country’s capital–labor ratio; RK/L denotes a country’s 
                                                  
5  This study focuses on trade exposure rather than trade liberalization. See Ederington et al. (2004) 
for the direct impact of liberalization on polluting activities. They study the effect of reductions in  7
relative capital–labor ratio; RS is relative GDP per capita
6; and  1 ε   is an error term and 
consists of an individual country effect  1 η  and a random disturbance  1 ν . To address 
the dynamics, the lagged dependent variable is included in (1) (see Arellano and Bond, 
1991).  
We are able to interpret each term following Antweiler et al. (2001) and Cole 
and Elliott (2003). The third term,  it S , and the fourth term, 
2
it S , on the right hand side 
in (1) reflect the effects of income and production on emissions. From this, we expect to 
estimate the scale-technique effect (Cole and Elliott, 2003). The 14th and 15th terms are 
additional technique effects. These terms represent international environmental treaties 
for emission reductions. In the case of SO2, two international environmental treaties are 
included in the regression. H denotes the Helsinki dummy, where 1 indicates that the 
country has ratified the Helsinki Protocol and 0 indicates otherwise, and O denotes the 
Oslo dummy, where 1 indicates ratification of the Oslo Protocol and 0 indicates 
otherwise
7. We should note that the decision of a country to ratify these protocols cannot 
be treated as exogenous because this decision is likely to be affected by that country’s 
economic conditions (see Beron et al., 2003; Murdoch et al., 2003). Similarly, the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Protocol on Water and Health are considered for the cases of 
CO2 and BOD, respectively, where detailed explanations are provided later. Therefore, 
to address self-selection bias, the predicted probability of reaching the ratification stage 
                                                                                                                                                  
US tariffs schedules on the output of pollution intensive industries. 
6  To show a country’s comparative advantage, a country’s capital–labor ratio and per capita income 
levels are expressed relative to the world average for each year, following Cole and Elliott (2003). 
7 The 1985 Helsinki Protocol on the reduction of sulfur emissions and their trans-boundary fluxes 
by at least 30 percent entered into force in 1987. The 1994 Oslo Protocol on the further reduction of 
sulfur emissions is a successor to the Helsinki Protocol and entered into force in 1998.    8
is calculated using probit estimation and is used for these dummy variables for the 
countries participating in the negotiations of these treaties
8. 
The fifth to 13th terms on the right hand side show the composition effects. A 
country’s comparative advantage is a major factor influencing the composition effects. 
We consider factor endowment, stringency of environmental regulations, and trade 
openness as factors affecting the comparative advantage (as in Antweiler et al., 2000; 
Cole and Elliott, 2003). A capital-abundant country will specialize in capital-intensive 
production, whereas a labor-abundant country has a comparative advantage in 
labor-intensive goods. Therefore, a country with a higher capital-labor ratio tends to 
have higher emissions because capital-intensive goods are associated with higher 
emissions (see Cole and Elliott, 2003). This effect is captured by the fifth to seventh and 
ninth to 13th terms. 
At the same time, however, a country with relatively more stringent regulations 
has a smaller comparative advantage in capital (pollution) intensive goods because 
production would be constrained by these regulations. It is important to know that there 
is a strong correlation between a sector’s capital intensity and its pollution intensity (see 
Cole and Elliott, 2003). Therefore, even if countries have a comparative advantage in 
capital (pollution) intensive goods (i.e., a higher capital-labor ratio), the comparative 
advantage is weakened and emissions would decrease in high-income countries. The 
seventh term in the equation reflects this effect. 
In addition, an increase in trade encourages an increase in the production of 
capital-intensive goods in countries that have a comparative advantage in these goods 
                                                  
8 The predicted probabilities are controlled for SO2 and CO2. The value for BOD emissions is not 
controlled because we are not able to obtain statistically significant results in the probit estimation.  9
and a decrease in the production of capital-intensive goods in countries that have a 
comparative disadvantage in capital-intensive goods (see the explanation of the KLE in 
footnote 1). This is captured by the ninth and tenth terms. An increase in trade might, 
however, encourage a shift in the production of capital-intensive goods from countries 
with more stringent environmental regulations (high income countries) to countries with 
less stringent environmental regulation (low income countries). This effect (see the 
explanation of the ERE in footnote 1) is captured by the 11
th to 13
th terms. 
2.2.2   Income  Equation 
Following the endogenous growth literature (see, e.g., Mankiw et al., 1992; 
Frankel and Romer, 1999), we control for trade openness, capital–labor ratio, 
population, and human capital in the income equation. The income equation is: 
21 12 3 4 15 2 ln ln ln ln( / ) ln ln it it it it it it it Sc S T K L P S c h β ββ β β ε −− =+ + + + + +   
22 2 it i it ε ην =+.         ( 2 )  
where  P is the population, Sch proxies human capital investment based on school 
attendance years, and  2 ε  is an error term and consists of an individual country effect 
2 η   and a random disturbance  2 ν . The other variables have been defined previously.   
2.2.3    Short-Term and Long-Term Effects and Trade-Induced Elasticity 
Short-Term Effect 
We can decompose the terms in equation (1) into two groups as follows. One is 
the scale-technique effect ( it Y ) and the other is the composition effect ( it C )
9. 
                                                  
9 Although discussions based on the decomposition are provided, we note that the decomposed 
effects are imputed instead of observed. For example, one could consider the case in which a higher 
K/L also leads to higher energy inputs, and there may not be compositional effects. Hence K/L may 
capture a technique effect, as S does. Similarly, a higher S may also induce structural shifts due to 
non-homothetic demand (see Echevarria, 2008) that move demand to cleaner service–type sectors.  10
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Equation 4 is divided into two parts: one with terms including  it T , which 
captures the effect of trade openness on the composition effect through the factor 
endowment and/or the environmental regulation effect, and another one without terms 
including  it T . 
 The first part of equation 4 is the direct effect of trade, and the latter is the 
indirect effect of trade. We name the former the Direct Trade-Induced Composition 
Effect ( it TC ) and the latter the Indirect Trade-Induced Composition Effect ( it OC ). This 
reflects the indirect effect of a trade-induced change in income on emissions. Once the 
environmental regulations in a country become more stringent following an increase in 
income, that country loses its comparative advantage in capital-intensive goods. Thus, 
TCit and OCit are expressed as follows: 
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is the trade elasticity of emissions driven by the scale-technique effect through changes 
in income. It is derived from (1) and given in (7). In the same way, 
S
TC σ  is the trade 
                                                                                                                                                  
Hence, S may have little relationship with regulation at all but may have a compositional effect. 
10  The superscripts “S” and “L” refer to the short- and long-term effects, respectively.  11
elasticity of emissions driven by the direct composition effect. It is derived from (5) and 
given in (8). Finally, 
S
OC σ 11 is the trade elasticity of emissions driven by the indirect 
composition effect through changes in income. It is derived from (6) and given in (9). It 
should be noted that we use the short-term trade elasticity of income, which is 
calculated from the income equation as β2, to obtain these elasticities.   
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As we can see from equation (5), the effect of an increase in trade intensity on 
emissions in (8) is divided into two effects: the direct effect of trade intensity and the 
indirect effect of trade intensity through changes in income. We define 
S
ITC σ 12 and 
S
DTC σ 13  as the elasticities that represent both of these effects.   
() it it i it
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[] [ ] ()
22
78 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 (/ ) (/ ) (/ )
S
DTC it it it it it it it RKL R KL R S R S R KL R S T σα α α α α α =+ + + + + ⋅
         ( 1 1 )  
                                                  
11 This elasticity implies an indirect trade-induced composition effect, or, more precisely, a 
composition effect caused by trade-induced income changes that affect the stringency of the 
country’s environmental regulations and that result in a change in the comparative advantage of 
capital-intensive goods. 
12 This is an indirect trade-induced composition effect. It is caused by a trade-induced income 
change that affects the ERE or the KLE. 
13 This is a direct trade-induced composition effect. It is caused by a trade intensity change that 
affects the ERE or the KLE.  12
From these elasticities, the total trade-induced composition effect, 
S








C σ σ σ σ + + = . However, the total trade-induced composition effect used by 
Cole and Elliott (2003) corresponds to 
S
DTC σ . Hence, they ignore the influence of 
S
OC σ  
and 
S
ITC σ . This might overestimate or underestimate the composition effect. Finally, the 
short-term overall trade openness elasticity of emissions, 
S
T σ , is calculated as follows: 
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Long-Term Effect 
In the same manner, each of the long-term effects of 
L
ST σ , 
L
OC σ , 
L
TC σ , 
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and 
L
DTC σ   can be defined. Considering that the long-term elasticity of trade openness to 
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The long-term overall trade openness elasticity of emissions, 
L
C σ , is calculated as 
follows:  13
LL L L L
TS T O C I T C D T C σσσ σ σ =++ +            ( 1 8 )  
 
3.  Estimation Strategy and Data 
3.1   Differenced  GMM 
Perman and Stern (2003) use the same data source for SO2 emissions as we do, 
and they find that a co-integrating relation exists between SO2 emissions per capita, 
income, and income squared for each country. This implies that long-run relationships 
exist among these variables and that the process of adjustment to the long-run 
equilibrium is slow. Since there is a possibility that other variables in our data also have 
long-run relationships, it is appropriate to adopt a model that takes the time factor into 
consideration in our study. 
 To address the dynamics, we adopt a differenced GMM, which is proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). This method has the advantage that it controls for both the 
long-run relationship and any endogeneity problems by including appropriate 
instrumental variables. We include dependent variables before t-2 and predicted values 
of both trade openness and income as instrumental variables.   
3.2 Data 
The data used in this study are obtained from different sources. We obtain SO2 
emissions data from The Center for Air Pollution Impact and Trend Analysis (CAPITA) 
and Stern (2005). This data set is superior to other data sets in terms of its spatial and 
temporal resolution and extent (Stern, 2005), and it covers more time and countries than 
the data Cole and Elliot applied. We also obtained updated CO2 emissions data and 
BOD emissions data from the same source as Cole and Elliot (2003); these data are 
beneficial for drawing comparisons with Cole and Elliot. The CO2 data is obtained from  14
the  Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), and the BOD data is 
obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI).   
 As discussed in Cole and Elliot (2003), because emissions data are often 
estimated using engineering functions based on inputs, the engineering assumptions 
may not reflect the true gains from techniques precisely
14. However, our estimates are 
able to adequately capture technique effects since each of these estimates considers 
country and year specific information. For example, in the case of SO2, the sulfur 
release factor is determined by technology information obtained by country and year 
from the International Energy Agency. This information is combined with the sulfur 
content data for refined products and the net production and is used in the final emission 
calculations (Lefohn et al., 1999). The data for CO2 is calculated using CO2 emissions 
factors for individual fuels, which stem from country and year specific estimates of fuel 
use. Since CO2 emissions factors cannot be reduced by end-of-pipe technology, they are 
time-invariant. However, regulations and technology improve fuel efficiency. Therefore, 
these emissions factors are generally updated over time to allow for changes in 
technology and regulations (Marland et al., 2000). On the other hand, the BOD 
emissions data is based on each country’s actual monitoring data, which measures the 
amount of oxygen that bacteria in water consume in breaking down waste
15. Hettige et 
al. (1998) first apply this data. They note that water pollution data are relatively reliable 
because the sampling techniques for measuring water pollution are more widely 
understood and much less expensive than those for air pollution. The World Bank’s 
                                                  
14 On the other hand, concentrations data tend to be affected by site-specific factors. For example, 
SO2 gas is produced from not only anthropogenic sources such as the burning of fossil fuels but also 
from natural sources such as transboundary movement and volcanoes. 
15  This is a standard water-treatment test for the presence of organic pollutants.  15
Development Research Group updated the data through 2004 using the same 
methodology as Hettige et al. (1998). 
SO2 and BOD have local and trans-boundary impacts, whereas CO2 is a 
greenhouse gas and has a global impact. See Cole and Elliot (2003) for a more detailed 
comparison of each emission. For data on SO2 and CO2, we have observations for 88 
countries covering the period from 1973–2000. For data on BOD, we have observations 
for 83 countries for the period from 1980–2000
16. We are able to obtain large sample 
sizes because annual data and data for a longer time span are available from several 
different data sources. For example, in case of SO2, our SO2 emissions data is annual 
and covers many countries, while Cole and Elliot (2003) obtain 5-year data from the 
United Nations Environment Programme: Environmental Data Report 1993-1994, 
which covers fewer countries. 
 Per capita income, which is defined as GDP per capita (measured in real 
dollars), and trade openness are taken from the Penn World Table 6.1. The capital-labor 
ratio is obtained from the Extended Penn World Table. Population and land area data 
come from the WDI. Data on school attainment (years) come from the education data 
set in Barro and Lee (2000), and distances between the country pairs in question 
(physical distance and dummy variables indicating common borders, linguistic links, 
and landlocked status) come from the Center for International Prospective Studies.  
 
                                                  
16  A list of countries used in this study for SO2, CO2, and BOD is presented in Appendix C.  16
4.  Estimation Results 
4.1.   Parameter  Estimates 
Table 1 presents the results of the differenced GMM with instrumental variables 
estimation of the environmental quality equation for SO2, CO2, and BOD.
17 Before 
discussing the result, it should be noted that the estimation methodology (i.e., the 
differenced GMM estimation taking endogeneity into account) is found to be more 
important to our results than the data used (see Appendix F for detail). In other words, 
the differences between the results of Antweiler et al. (2001) and Cole and Elliot (2003) 
and our results seem mainly to stem from estimation methods rather than from data
18. In 
the equations, the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions and the hypothesis of no 
second-order autocorrelation imply that the instruments used in the GMM estimation 
are valid and that there is no serial correlation in the error term
19. Table 2 and Table 3 
report the short-term and long-term elasticities of trade openness on emissions,  ST σ , 
C σ ,  OC σ ,  ITC σ ,  DTC σ  and  T σ , respectively. They are evaluated for sample averages 
of OECD countries and non-OECD countries using the estimated parameters. The 
values calculated with an average of all samples are also reported for reference. We 
obtained statistically significant results for all elasticities.   
The lagged emissions terms for all specifications are statistically significant with 
a positive sign, but their values are less than one. These results imply that changes in 
                                                  
17 For a robustness check, Appendix D provides results for different estimation techniques. The 
results for NOx are provided in Appendix E.   
18  The differences in estimation results between our study and the previous studies might be caused 
by changes in data and/or by differences in estimation methods. We intend to identify the sources of 
such differences. The identifications of discrepancies between our study and former studies are 
provided in Appendix F, which includes replications of Cole and Elliot (2003).     
19  In the case of BOD, we are not able to pass AR(2) tests, though the t-value is small enough.  17
explanatory variables, such as trade openness, at a specific point in time would also 
influence emissions after the current period. This indicates that there is an adjustment 
process and that the short- and long-term effects of trade on emissions are different. 
Therefore, we need to use a dynamic model, although previous studies do not. 
Comparing Table 2 to Table 3, we find that the long-term elasticities are larger than the 
short-term elasticities.   
In all of the specifications for SO2, CO2, and BOD, almost all of the variables, 
including the endogenous variables such as trade openness, per capita income, and their 
interaction terms, have statistically significant effects. It is important to note that our 
statistical results for SO2, CO2, and BOD are somewhat different from those of Cole and 
Elliott (2003). As is discussed in Appendix D, these discrepancies are caused by 
differences in the estimation methods. In the methods, we correct for serial correlation, 
use dynamic GMM, and use instrumental variables techniques.   
The sign of S is positive with statistical significance in the SO2 and CO2 
estimates but negative in the BOD estimates, while the sign of S
2 is negative with 
statistical significance in all three estimates. These results indicate that (i) the 
scale-technique effect is negative for BOD and (ii) a negative technique effect gradually 
dominates a positive scale effect for SO2 and CO2 as income increases because higher 
income leads to a greater demand for a better environment. To consider the effect of an 
increase of S on per capita SO2, CO2 and BOD emissions more precisely, we calculated 
the values of  23 2 S α α +  and  ST σ  using sample means of income in OECD and 
non-OECD countries. We find that both values are negative for SO2 and CO2 in OECD 
countries but positive in non-OECD countries
20. In other words, an increase in either 
                                                  
20  2 β   is estimated to be statistically significant with a positive sign, as is discussed in Appendix A.  18
production or income leads to an increase in emissions in non-OECD countries but to a 
decrease in emissions in OECD countries. Thus, in the average non-OECD country, the 
scale effect dominates the technique effect because of the overall lower demand for a 
better environment due to lower income, whereas in the average OECD country the 
technique effect dominates the scale effect. 
We also find that both the average OECD country and the average non-OECD 
country have a negative value for BOD. Hence, the technique effect dominates the scale 
effect in both developed and developing countries. This might be because the social 
pressure against water pollution is likely to be stronger than that against air pollution. In 
addition, there is some evidence that developing countries use abatement technologies 
for SO2 from developed countries less frequently than those for BOD, possibly because 
of higher costs (Cheremisinoff, 2001). Thus, a technique effect might be more likely to 
dominate a scale effect in the case of BOD. 
It should be noted that the values of  23 2 S α α +  and  ST σ  for SO2 are smaller 
than those for CO2 for both OECD and non-OECD countries. This result may stem from 
a greater awareness of the negative effects of SO2. It is usually hard to perceive the 
future damages caused by CO2, unlike those of SO2. 
The sign of the cross product of KL and S is positive with statistical significance 
in all estimates, making  OC σ   positive for all estimates. One reason for this result might 
be that technological changes resulting in stronger comparative advantages in 
capital-intensive goods occur as the production scale increases
21. We find a positive 
                                                  
21  An increase of income weakens the comparative advantages in capital-intensive products because 
of stricter environmental policies, but it also strengthens these advantages because of technological 
changes caused by a larger production scale. The sign of this interaction term suggests that the latter 
dominates the former. This is pointed out by the referee.  19
sign for KL and a negative sign for KL
2 for all estimates, with statistical significance in 
all cases except for KL in the SO2 equation. These results suggest that increases in the 
capital-labor ratio lead to increases in per capita emissions with a diminishing marginal 
effect. 
As the dummies for ratification of the Helsinki and Oslo Protocols are 
statistically significant with a negative sign, the countries participating in international 
environmental treaties are associated with lower SO2 emissions relative to nonratifying 
countries. This indicates that these treaties were effective in reducing SO2 emissions. In 
contrast, the dummies for Kyoto Protocol and Protocol on Water and Health are 
statistically insignificant, although their signs are negative
22. Therefore, there is a 
possibility that these protocols were not effective at reducing emissions within our 
sample period. Note that we use predicted values from a probit estimation to account for 
possible self-selection bias; the estimation results are described in Appendix B. 
4.2  Environmental regulation effect vs. Capital-labor effect 
With trade intensity increased, a country that has a comparative advantage in 
capital-intensive products is likely to increase its emissions by specializing more in 
these products. Factor endowment, i.e., the KLE, can affect this comparative advantage. 
On the other hand, environmental policy can also affect this comparative advantage. In 
other words, a country which enforces relatively strict environmental policies is likely 
to have less of a comparative advantage in capital-intensive goods following an increase 
                                                  
22 It is notable that we use signification data for the Kyoto Protocol and the Protocol on Water and 
Health in place of ratification data because few countries ratify them within the sample period. 
Therefore, there is a possibility that we cannot control for the effect of these protocols appropriately, 
and we report two specifications, one with the protocols and the other without them, for each 
emission. Note that we calculate all values, including elasticities, in this study using the 
specifications without these protocols.  20
in trade intensity, thereby decreasing its emissions as its relative production of these 
goods decreases , i.e. the ERE. 
We are able to determine how an increase in trade intensity affects composition 
effects through both the KLE and the ERE by looking at the sign of the following 
equation, where KLE_EREit, is determined by the first-order partial derivatives of 
equation (1) with respect to T. 
[ ] [ ]
22
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         ( 1 9 )  
As Table 1 indicates, all of the parameter estimates included in the above 
equation are statistically significant. Hereafter, since it is difficult to interpret each of 
the parameter estimates, we try only to evaluate the value of the above equation using 
sample averages for both OECD and non-OECD countries by pollutant. It should be 
noted that  DTC σ  corresponds to this equation, as is shown in equations (11) and (17). 
We obtain negative values for both KLE_EREit, and  DTC σ , as is shown in Tables 2 and 
3, for OECD countries, but we obtain positive values for both KLE_EREit, and  DTC σ  
for non-OECD countries over all pollutants. This implies that an increase in trade 
intensity results in a decrease in emissions in OECD countries and an increase in 
emissions in non-OECD countries. Because the sample averages of RS and RKL are 
larger than 1 in OECD countries and are less than 1 in non-OECD countries, we see that 
developed countries have a comparative advantage in capital-intensive production and 
enforce relatively strict environmental policies. Meanwhile, developing countries have a 
comparative advantage in labor-intensive production and enforce relatively lax 
environmental policies. The negative sign of KLE_ERE in developed countries implies 
that the ERE dominates the KLE. On the other hand, the positive sign of KLE_ERE in  21
developing countries implies that the ERE dominates the KLE. Thus, we find that the 
ERE dominates the KLE both in OECE and non-OECD countries. 
Finally, we intend to explore whether the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) 
hypothesis is supported
23. For this reason, we take the first-order and second-order 
partial derivatives of equation (1) with respect to S as follows: 
() it it W
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L K S EKC ) / ( 2 ) / ( 2 12 11 10 6 3 2 α α α α α α + + + + + =     （20） 
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We find that the values in (20) evaluated at the means of the OECD and 
non-OECD samples are negative and positive for SO2 and CO2, respectively, and 
negative for BOD. We also find that the values in (21) evaluated at the means of the 
OECD and non-OECD samples are negative for all emissions. This indicates that the 
EKC hypothesis is likely to be supported for SO2 and CO2 but not for BOD. 
4.3    Overall Effect of Trade Openness on Emissions 
 As already discussed, the elasticities of the trade-induced scale-technique effect, 
ST σ , for CO2 and SO2 are found to be negative for OECD countries but positive for 
non-OECD countries, while that for BOD is found to be negative both for OECD and 
non-OECD countries. The elasticity of the trade-induced composition effect,  C σ , is 
positive in both cases. From these estimations, following results can be summarized: 
                                                  
23 The uses of per capita GDP and its quadratic to capture both scale and technique effects are 
consistent with some of the studies on the EKC. However, we note recent studies applying a cubic 
factor or a nonparametric method to test the EKC. Additionally, we may only estimate the compound 
effect of the three effects (Grossman and Krueger, 1995).  22
(1) The overall effect of trade openness on emissions,  T σ , is negative for all pollutants 
in OECD countries because the negative trade-induced scale-technique effect 
dominates the positive trade-induced composition effect.   
(2) The overall effect of trade openness is positive for SO2 and CO2 but negative for 
BOD in non-OECD countries. This is mainly because the trade-induced 
scale-technique effect and the trade-induced composition effect are both positive in 
the cases of SO2 and CO2. On the other hand, since the technologies developed by 
OECD countries to reduce BOD emissions are available in non-OECD countries and 
these technologies have lower costs, the negative scale-technique effect dominates 
the positive trade-induced composition effect for BOD. 
(3) Trade openness therefore reduces BOD emissions both in OECD and non-OECD 
countries, while it reduces SO2 and CO2 emissions in OECD countries and increases 
them in non-OECD countries.   
(4) The short-term elasticities of the overall effect of trade openness on SO2, CO2, and 
BOD are –0.147, –0.054, and –0.058 for OECD countries, and 0.030, and 0.113, 
–0.004 for non-OECD countries, respectively. On the other hand, in the long term, 
they are –2.228, –0.186, and –0.224 for OECD countries and 0.920, 0.883, and 
–0.155 for non-OECD countries, respectively.   
(5) Looking at the above estimations, we see that the short-term overall effects are small 
for all pollutants and for OECD and non-OECD countries. We also find that the 
magnitude of the long-term overall effects varies. In the cases of SO2 in OECD 
countries and of SO2 and CO2 in non-OECD countries, the effects are large. In the 
case of SO2 in OECD countries, the scale-technique effects are not offset by the 
composition effects in the long term, whereas in the case of SO2 and CO2 in  23
non-OECD countries, the composition effects are added to the scale-technique 
effects. In the other cases, the scale-technique effects are offset by the composition 
effects, and the overall long-term effects are small. 
(6) As previously presented, we find that the sign of 
S
T σ  is negative in OECD 
countries and positive in non-OECD countries for SO2 and CO2. This suggests that 
there might be some turnover level of income at which this sign changes from 
positive to negative as the level of income increases. We would like to determine the 
average turnover incomes of OECD and non-OECD countries respectively using 
their average K/L, RK/L, and T. The average turnover income for SO2 is $24,616 for 
OECD countries and $14,045 for non-OECD countries, while that for CO2 is 
$29,678 for OECD countries and $24,732 for non-OECD countries. We find that the 
average turnover income for OECD countries is larger than that for non-OECD 
countries. OECD countries have a comparative advantage in the production of 
capital-intensive goods due to a larger K/L compared with non-OECD countries. 
Hence, OECD countries need a higher income for the technique effect to cancel out 
the scale effect. We also find that the turnover income for CO2 is larger than that for 




Economists have been analyzing for decades how trade intensity affects 
environmental quality. However, both the theoretical and the empirical literature on 
trade, economic development, and the environment are largely inconclusive about the 
                                                  
24 For BOD emissions, we are not able to calculate the turnover income since the elasticities of 
overall income are always negative.  24
overall impact of trade on the environment. Openness to international trade is expected 
to have both positive and negative effects (Grossman and Krueger, 1993; Copeland and 
Taylor; 2005). Previous studies have been unable to estimate the overall impact of trade 
openness on the environment. 
This study treats trade and income as endogenous and estimates the overall 
impact of trade openness on the environment using the instrumental variables technique. 
This study has analyzed the causal effects of trade openness on SO2, CO2, and BOD 
emissions by using extensive annual data for OECD and non-OECD countries. We find 
that whether trade has a beneficial effect on the environment on average or not varies 
depending on the pollutant and the country. A 1% increase in trade openness causes an 
increase of 0.920% and 0.883% in SO2 and CO2 emissions, respectively, and a decrease 
of 0.155% in BOD emissions in non-OECD countries in the long term. On the other 
hand, the long-term effects for OECD countries are –2.228%, –0186%, and –0.224% for 
SO2, CO2 and BOD, respectively. 
Our results also show that there is a sharp contrast between OECD and 
non-OECD countries with regard to SO2 and CO2. Both in the short and long terms, 
trade reduces emissions of these pollutants only in OECD countries. On the other hand, 
we find that trade has a beneficial effect on BOD emissions all over the world in both 
the short and long terms. We also find that there is a distinct difference between 
short-term elasticities and long-term elasticities, implying that it is important to take 
dynamics into consideration. Finally, trade openness influences emissions through the 
environmental regulation effect and capital labor effect. We find that the former effect is 
likely to be larger than the latter effect for all pollutants.    25
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Table 1. The determinants of SO2, CO2, and BOD Emissions per capita (Differenced GMM) 
Note:  Values in parentheses are t–values. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** 
Significant at the 1% level. Trade openness, per capita GDP, and its square term are instrumented for using 
predicted openness, predicted per capita GDP, and predicted its square term, respectively. 
Variable  SO2 
(Protocol)  SO2  CO2 
（Protocol）  CO2  BOD 
（Protocol）  BOD 
































































































































































(–4.01)  – – – –  – 
Oslo Protocol 
–0.040*** 
(–2.93)  – – – –  – 
Kyoto Protocol  – –  –0.0025 




–  – – –  –0.010 














Observations  2152  2152 2152 2152 1159  1159 
Number of 
countries 
88  88 88 88 83  83 
Sargan test  76.29  75.99 76.27 79.84 70.39  67.46 
AR(1)  –4.41***  –4.44*** –3.45*** –3.52*** –3.27***  –3.38*** 
AR(2)  –0.01  –0.02 –0.94 –0.94 1.74*  1.75* 
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Table 2. Short Term Trade Elasticity (Differenced GMM) 
Elasticity  SO2  CO2  BOD 
S
ST σ   –0.176*** –0.058***  –0.144* 
S
OC σ   0.146***  0.046*** 0.130*** 
S
ITC σ   0.000*  0.000*  0.000*** 
S
C σ  
S









T σ   –0.147** –0.054* –0.058* 
S
ST σ   0.006*** 0.012*** –0.034* 
S
OC σ   0.008***  0.003*** 0.010*** 
S
ITC σ   0.000*  0.000*  0.000*** 
S
C σ  
S









T σ   0.030** 0.113*  –0.004* 
S
ST σ   –0.016*** 0.008***  –0.067* 
S
OC σ   0.031***  0.010*** 0.037*** 
S
ITC σ   0.000*  0.000*  0.000*** 
S
C σ  
S









T σ   –0.042** 0.055* –0.048* 
Note:  * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3. Long Term Trade Elasticity (Differenced GMM) 
Elasticity  SO2  CO2  BOD 
L
ST σ   –10.908*** –2.388***  –1.239* 
L
OC σ   9.012***  2.301*** 1.114*** 
L
ITC σ   0.028**  0.008*  0.002*** 
L
C σ  
L









T σ   –2.228** –0.186* –0.224* 
L
ST σ   0.378*** 0.513*** –0.289* 
L
OC σ   0.495***  0.126*** 0.089*** 
L
ITC σ   –0.000*  –0.000*  0.001*** 
L
C σ  
L









T σ   0.920** 0.883* –0.155* 
L
ST σ   –0.979*** 0.348***  –0.572* 
L
OC σ   1.891***  0.483*** 0.314*** 
L
ITC σ   0.001**  –0.000*  0.001*** 
L
C σ  
L









T σ   0.736** 0.923* –0.299* 





Appendix for Referee (Supplementary files) 
 
Appendix A.  Model of Income and Trade Openness 
A.1   Income  Equation 
Table A-1 presents the results of the GMM estimation using instrumental 
variables for the income equation (2) using the same sample as in equation (1)
25. In the 
equation, the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions and the hypothesis of no 
second-order autocorrelation imply that the instruments used in the GMM estimation 
are valid and that there is no serial correlation in the error term. The lagged GDP per 
capita terms for all specifications are significant with a positive sign. This indicates that 
there is an adjustment process and that we should use a dynamic model even though the 
previous studies did not. Trade intensity has a statistically significant positive effect for 
all specifications. This indicates that trade openness contributes to the increase in GDP 
per capita. This is consistent with the literature (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Dollar and 
Kraay, 2003; Noguer and Siscart, 2005)
26. 
 
                                                  
25  The results for both gravity and income are in line with the general findings in the literature. 
26 However, this relationship is the subject of a large and somewhat controversial literature (for 
example, see Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001). We estimate several different specifications to obtain the 
trade elasticities and confirm that use of these elasticities would not alter our overall elasticities’ 
signs in (12) and (18).    32

















Note:  Values in parentheses are t–values. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% 
level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Trade openness is instrumented for using predicted 
openness. 
Sample used for  SO2 & CO2 BOD 




























Observations  2152 1159 
Number of countries  88 83 
Sargan test  86.32 79.47 
AR(1)  –4.64*** –3.27*** 
AR(2)  –1.53 0.29 
 
 
A.2    Trade Openness Equation 
The endogeneity of trade is a familiar problem from the empirical literature on 
income and openness (e.g., Noguer and Siscart, 2005). Thus, instrumental variables 
estimations are used in this study, following Frankel and Rose (2005). The gravity 
model of bilateral trade offers good instrumental variables for trade because these are 
exogenous yet highly correlated with trade. We use indicators of country size 
(population, and land area) and distances between the pairs of countries in question 
(physical distance and dummy variables indicating common borders, linguistic links, 
and landlocked status). The equation is: 
31 2 3 4
56 3
ln( / ) ln ln
ln( )
ij i ij j ij ij
ij i j i j




=+ + + +
+⋅ + +
   (A-1) 
where Tradeij is the bilateral trade flows from country i to country j, GDPi is the Gross 
Domestic Product of country i, Disij is the distance between country i and country j, Pj  33
is the population of country j, Lanij is a common language dummy that takes a value of 
1 if two countries have the same language and 0 otherwise, Borij is a common border 
dummy that takes a value of 1 if countries i and j share a border and 0 otherwise, Area is 
land area, and Landlocked  is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if one country is 
landlocked, 2 if both countries are landlocked, and 0 otherwise, and  3 ε  is an error 
term. 
The result is presented in Table A-2. We construct IV for openness as follows. A 
first-stage regression of the gravity equation is computed. Then, we take the exponential 
of the fitted values of bilateral trade and sum across bilateral trading partners as follows: 
 ln( / ) ij i j Exp Fitted Trade GDP ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ∑      (A-2) 
This fitted openness variable is added as an additional IV for the GMM. 
 













Note:    Values in parentheses are t–values. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 






















Observations  29147 
R squared  0.25 
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Appendix B. The Effect of Ratifying Multinational Environmental Agreements 
We apply the probit model to the decisions of individual countries to ratify 
international environmental agreements following Beron et al. (2003) and Murdoch et 
al. (2003). Let the dependent variable yi = 1 for countries that ratify the international 
environmental accord and yi = 0 for nonratifying countries. The unknown parameters 
can be estimated with a standard probit model. In modeling the Helsinki and Oslo 
Protocols, we define yi to equal 1 for countries that ratified the relevant protocol, 
whereas for the Kyoto Protocol and the Protocol on Water and Health
27, we define yi to 
equal 1 for countries that signed the relevant protocol because there are few countries 
that ratified these protocols within our data period
28. 
We consider two factors that influence these decisions. These factors are 
environmental quality as a normal good and the cost of compliance with the protocol. A 
country that ratifies or signs the protocol can be seen as a member of a group of nations 
that is voluntarily providing a public good. This is because additional demand for 
environmental quality comes with higher level of wealth. We use a country’s average 
GNP per capita, lagged five years, to test this relationship; a positive sign is expected in 
the probit model. 
Countries that ratify or sign these protocols are required to achieve some 
emissions level. Lagged emissions levels should therefore influence the cost of 
complying with the protocol. That is, we assume countries with higher emission levels 
                                                  
27  The Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes is the first international agreement adopted 
specifically to attain an adequate supply of safe drinking water and adequate sanitation for people 
and to effectively protect water used for drinking. 
28  The Kyoto Protocol on reducing the emissions of carbon dioxide was adopted on 11 December 
1997, and 84 countries signed in 1998 or 1999, whereas the Protocol on Water and Health was 
adopted in 1999, and 36 countries signed in 1999 or 2000.  35
incur greater costs than countries with lower levels, implying that the net benefits from 
ratifying or signing a protocol are lower for high-emission countries. Therefore, we 
expect lagged emissions (as a proxy for compliance cost) to be negatively related to the 
ratification or signification decision. 
Although there are several more variables included in the literature, we limit 
ourselves to two variables owing to multicollinearity and limited degrees of freedom. 
We use data from 20, 19, 172, and 16 nations for the Helsinki Protocol, Oslo Protocol, 
Kyoto Protocol, and Protocol on Water and Health, respectively. Samples used in the 
estimations of the Helsinki Protocol, Oslo Protocol, and Protocol on Water and Health 
are taken from the participant countries in the UN Economic Commission for Europe. 
Around 60%, 70%, and 65% of the countries participated in each protocol, respectively. 
Samples used in the estimation of the Kyoto Protocol are taken from the participant 
countries in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, where 
around 46% of the countries signed the protocol. The probit estimation results are 
presented in Table B.   
For the Helsinki Protocol, Oslo Protocol, and Kyoto Protocol, we obtained 
statistically significant results that are almost in line with the expected sign. The only 
exception is the sign of lagged emissions for the Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, we 
are not able to obtain a statistically significant result for the Protocol on Water and 
Health. Predicted probabilities are calculated and are then imputed to the original 
Helsinki, Oslo, and Kyoto Protocol variables. 
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Note:  Values in parentheses are t–values. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** 
Significant at the 1% level. 
Variable Helsinki  Oslo  Kyoto  Water and 
Health 




























Observations  20 19  172 16 
Log-Likelihood Value  –5.26 –7.02  –93.90 –9.95 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.60 0.36 0.16 0.06 
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Appendix C. Data and the List of the Countries Used for This Study 
List of the countries used for this study is provided in Table C.   
 
Table C.  Lists of the Country in This Study 
North America  Uruguay Belgium  Gambia
a 
Canada Venezuela  Britain  Ghana 
USA  Asia  Cyprus Kenya 
Latin America  Bangladesh Denmark  Malawi
 
Argentine China  Finland  Mali
b 
Barbados
  Hong Kong
  France Mauritania
b 
Bolivia India  Greece  Mauritius
 
Brazil Indonesia  Hungary  Mozambique 
Chile Japan  Iceland  Niger
 
Colombia Korea  Ireland Rwanda
 
Costa Rica  Malaysia  Italy  Senegal 
Dominica Nepal  Netherlands  Sierra  Leone
b 
Ecuador Pakistan  Portugal  South  Africa 
El Salvador  Philippines  Romania  Togo 
Guatemala Singapore  Spain  Tunisia 
Guiana Sri  Lanka  Sweden  Uganda
 
Haiti
b  Thailand Switzerland  Zambia 
Honduras  Middle East  Africa  Zimbabwe 
Jamaica Iran  Benin
b  Oceania 
Mexico Israel Burundi
b  Australia 
Nicaragua Jordan  Cameroon  Fiji
 
Panama Syria  Central  Africa




   
Peru  Europe  Egypt   
Trinidad and Tobago  Austria  Ethiopia   
Note  
a Not included in SO2 and CO2 specification. 
b Not included in BOD specification   
 
Simple scatter plots are portrayed in Figure C, where there are not rough 
correlation between emissions and trade. 
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SO2 emissions per capita against Trade openness          CO2 emissions per capita against Trade openness            BOD emissions per capita against Trade openness 
 
SO2 emissions per capita against GDP per capita            CO2 emissions per capita against GDP per capita            BOD emissions per capita against GDP per capita 
 
SO2 emissions per capita against Capital–labor ratio        CO2 emissions per capita against Capital–labor ratio        BOD emissions per capita against Capital–labor ratio 
 
GDP  per  capita  against  Trade  openness              Capital–labor  ratio  against  Trade  openness          GDP  per  capita  against  Capital–labor ratio 
Fig. C.    Simple scatter plots of data 
Note: Vertical axis and horizontal axis are expressed as follows. In the case that the figure title is “A
against B”, vertical axis and horizontal axis corresponds to A and B, respectively. SO2 emissions per
capita, CO2 emissions per capita and BOD emissions per capita are measured in kg, tons and kg,
respectively. Trade openness, real GDP per capita and Capital–labor ratio are measured in %, $ and
capital per worker, respectively. 
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Appendix D.  The determinants of SO2, CO2, and BOD Emissions per capita (OLS, fixed effects, and differenced GMM) 
Note:  Values in parentheses are t–values. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. In differenced 
GMM, trade openness, per capita GDP, and its square term are instrumented for using predicted openness, predicted per capita GDP, and predicted its 

















( Fixed effects )
BOD 
(GMM) 
1 ln it E −   – –  0.68*** 
(90.02)  – –  0.60*** 
(28.38)  – –  0.58*** 
(21.52) 










































































































































































































Time trend  –0.020*** 
(–7.06) 
–0.017*** 
(–10.56)  –  –0.0061*** 
(–2.78) 
0.0050*** 
(5.78)  –  –0.015*** 
(–5.34) 
–0.0076*** 
(–4.31)  – 


















Observations  2152  2152 2152 2152  2152  2152  1159 1159 1159 
Number of countries  88  88  88  88  88  88  83  83  83 
R  squared  0.52  0.34 – 0.81 0.39  –  0.70  0.19 – 
Sargan test  –  –  75.99  –  –  79.84  –  –  67.46 
AR(1)  –  – –4.44*** –  –  –3.52***  –  – –3.38*** 
AR(2) –  –  –0.02  –  – –0.94  – –  1.75*  40
Appendix E. The results for NOx 
We obtain NOx emissions data from The Emission Database for Global 
Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) for 1990, 1995, and 2000, meaning that the data is 
available for only three years. The decision to ratify the Sofia Protocol
29 occurred in 
1988 and the first year of data is from 1990, so we did not use a probit model. Instead, 
we use a simple dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the country has already 
ratified the 1988 Sofia protocol and 0 otherwise. Table F-1 presents the estimated 
parameters of equation (1) using differenced GMM, while Table F-2 presents the 
trade-induced elasticities evaluated at the sample means. As is shown in Table F-2, the 
elasticities of the trade-induced scale-technique effect,  ST σ , are statistically significant 
with a positive sign in all cases. This result indicates that the scale effect dominates the 
technique effect. The elasticities of the trade-induced composition effects,  C σ , and of 
the overall effect,  T σ , are insignificant. 
 
                                                  
29  This required the countries in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe that signed 
the Protocol to stabilize emissions of NOx against 1987 levels by 1994, and some countries 
committed themselves to 30% reductions by 1998 (against levels of any year between 1980 and 
1986).  41



































Note:  Values in parentheses are t–values. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. ***
Significant at the 1% level. Trade openness, per capita GDP, and its square term are instrumented for using
predicted openness, predicted per capita GDP, and predicted its square term, respectively. 
Variable  NOx 
（Protocol）  NOx 









































































Sargan test  5.40 5.69 
AR(1)  – – 
AR(2)  – –  42
Table E-2. Trade Elasticity (Differenced GMM) 
Short Term  Long Term  Elasticity 
NOx NOx 
ST σ   0.482* 1.951* 
OC σ   –0.404** –1.636** 
ITC σ   –0.002*  –0.007*  C σ  






T σ   –0.337 0.092 
ST σ   0.049* 0.200* 
OC σ   –0.022** –0.090** 
ITC σ   –0.000*  –0.001*  C σ  






T σ   –0.297 –0.061 
ST σ   0.130* 0.525* 
OC σ   –0.085** –0.343** 
ITC σ   –0.001**  –0.002*  C σ  






T σ   –0.565 –0.141 
Note:  * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Appendix F. Why the Results are Different from Previous Studies?   
This paper is an improvement on papers by Antweiler et al. (2001) and Cole and 
Elliott (2003). By applying instrumental variables and using data from more years and 
countries, we find different results. Therefore, it is critical to understand where the 
differences come from. 
First, we try to replicate the results of Antweiler et al. (2001) and Cole and Elliot 
(2003). We apply fixed effects estimation methods to the closest possible approximation 
to previous studies’ data sets in terms of emissions data and country and year 
coverage.
30 We calculate the scale-technique effect
31 and  DTC σ  and compare them 
with previous studies’ trade-induced effects. We are able to obtain similar elasticities to 
those found in previous studies, as shown in Table F-1,
32   although some elasticities are 
not statistically significant. 
Second, to clarify how important our instruments are, we also apply OLS 
estimation and differenced GMM estimation to the same data. We present  ST σ  and 
DTC σ  as calculated using OLS estimation, fixed effects estimation, and differenced 
                                                  
30  Although we tried to obtain the same data as previous studies, we were not able to obtain exactly 
the same data. To replicate Cole and Elliot (2003), we collected emissions data from the same data 
source as theirs. However, we did not obtain a complete set of years and countries. More specifically, 
we were able to collect data from 24 out of 26 countries for SO2, 26 out of 32 countries for CO2, and 
25 out of 32 countries for BOD, and we were not able to obtain BOD data for 1975-1979. On the 
other hand, to replicate Antweiler et al. (2001), we used our emissions data for the countries and 
years in their paper, and we apply the same specification as ours because of data limitations. We are 
able to collect emissions data for SO2 for 36 out of the 43 countries in Antweiler et al. (2001). 
31  Note that we calculate the scale-technique effect, not the trade-induced scale-technique effect. 
32 Exceptions are  DTC σ  for SO2 from Antweiler et al. (2001) and  DTC σ  for BOD from Cole and 
Elliot (2003). These seem to be different because we were not able to obtain a complete data set to 
match those used in previous studies.  44
GMM estimation in sections (a), (b), and (c) of Table F-2 respectively. There may be 
other factors such as autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity that could bias the results of 
the OLS estimation. We obtained different results from the OLS and GMM estimates, 
which might imply that we need to take these factors into consideration. In addition, we 
obtain different elasticities using fixed effects and GMM, which also might imply that 
including instrumental variables has an impact on the results. 
Third, to consider the effect of updating data, we perform a fixed effects 
estimation using the data in this study. Section (d) of Table F-2 shows the elasticities 
found using fixed effects as well as the elasticities found using OLS and differenced 
GMM estimation. These estimates come from our original data set
33. We find that the 
change in data used has a small effect on the elasticities compared to the change in 
estimation methods. Therefore, we conclude that the differences between the results of 
Antweiler et al. (2001), Cole and Elliot (2003), and our study seem to stem mainly from 
differences in estimation methods rather than differences in data used. In other words, it 
is important to take endogeneity into consideration. 
 
Table F-1. Replication of previous studies (Fixed effects) 
Note:  * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
Elasticities are evaluated at sample means. 
Effect   SO2  CO2  BOD 
Reproduced directly from Cole and Elliott (2003)  –1.7** 0.46***  –0.06***
Our Replication of Cole and Elliot (2003)  –0.491 0.094*** –0.031 




technique effects) Our Replication of Antweiler et al. (2001)  –0.887***    
Reproduced directly from Cole and Elliott (2003)  0.3*** 0.049*  –0.05***
Our Replication of Cole and Elliot (2003)  0.631* 0.151**  0.112* 
Reproduced directly from Antweiler et al. (2001)  –0.864***     DTC σ  
Our Replication of Antweiler et al. (2001)  0.108*     
 
                                                  
33 We present parameter estimates of OLS, fixed effects, and differenced GMM using the data in 
this study in Appendix D.  45
Table F-2. Comparison of  ST σ  and  DTC σ  using  different  data  and estimation methods   
OLS  
(Antweiler et al.)  SO2  OLS  
(Cole and Elliot)  SO2 CO2 BOD 
ST σ   –0.026***  ST σ   0.539 0.180***  0.296***  (a) 
DTC σ   –0.075 
 
DTC σ   0.493 0.068  0.257*** 
Fixed effects 
(Antweiler et al.)  SO2  Fixed effects 
(Cole and Elliot)  SO2 CO2 BOD 
ST σ   –0.019**  ST σ   –0.026 0.005***  –0.002  (b) 
DTC σ   0.108* 
 
DTC σ   0.631* 0.151**  0.112* 
GMM  
(Antweiler et al.)  SO2  GMM  
(Cole and Elliot)  SO2 CO2 BOD 
ST σ   0.027***  ST σ   0.326* 0.029 0.023  (c) 
DTC σ   –0.015*** 
 
DTC σ   –0.527* 0.090***  0.067 
OLS  
(this study)  SO2 CO2 BOD  Fixed effects 
(this study)  SO2 CO2 BOD 
ST σ   0.087*** 0.137***  0.007***  ST σ   –0.005*** 0.040***  –0.007 
DTC σ   –0.115*** 0.171*** 0.236***  DTC σ   0.002* 0.058***  0.019** 
GMM  
(this study)  SO2 CO2 BOD 
ST σ   –0.016*** 0.008***  –0.022* 
(d) 
DTC σ   –0.057* 0.037*  –0.018* 
 
Note: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
Antweiler et al. stands for the data on Antweiler et al. (2001), Cole and Elliot stands for the data on 
Cole and Elliot (2003), and this study stands for updated data in this study. To calculateall  ST σ , we 
use  2 β , which we obtain from income equation using differenced GMM estimation. 
 